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ABSTRACT 
This  note  discuses  the  problem of  handling 
uncertainty  in  the  management  of  marine 
resources. In one  approach,  "science  first," 
scientific  questions  of  fact  are  addressed  first. 
Once  it  is  concluded  that  there  is a high 
probability  that  there  is a problem,  the  analysis 
preceeds  to  value  questions,  where  the  costs  and 
benefits  of  possible  remedies are weighed. In 
the  alternative  "policy  first"  approach,  value 
questions  are  addressed  at  the  beginning.  The 
note  suggests  that  both  approaches  are  needed  and 
can  be  fitted  together  using a framework  of 
statlstical  decision  theory. 
We know little  about the effects  of  toxic 
chemicals,  and  little  about  the  importance  for 
toxics  of  wastewater  and  sludge  disposal  in 
coastal  waters  relative  to  other  transport 
mechanlsms  such  as  air  pollution  and  groundwater 
contamination.  There are  large  gaps  in our 
knowledge of the  more  traditional  materials  as 
well -- the  natural  organics,  nutrients,  and 
metals.  We can  measure  changes  in  worm 
populations  where  sludge  is  discharged,  but we
know very  little  of  the  long  term  implications  of 
such  disturbances. 
The  nature  of  uncertainty  varies  from  one 
management  problem  to another,  from  toxics  to 
pathogens  to  other  materials. For some  problems, 
such as toxics,  uncertainty is very  great  and for 
other  problems  the  appropriate  alternatives  are 
more  clearcut, because in  spite of the  remaining 
uncertainties  the  alternatives  are  few  and 
simple,  and  the  weight  of  evidence  leans  strongly 
to  one  slde. 
The purpose  of  this  note  is  to  discuss  how 
uncertainty  can  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
formation  of  policy  and  decision. The  starting 
point  is  the  realization  that  because of existing 
uncertainty,  the  policy  maker  is  condemned  to 
make  decisions  under  uncertainty. A decision  to 
postpone  some  action  until more  is  learned  is a
decision  under  uncertainty,  just  as  much  as  is a
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decision  to  take a precautionary  action  in  the 
meantime. A decision  to  promote  further 
research,  and  what  type  of  research, is still a 
decision  under  uncertainty. 
Yet  decisions  are  made  "in  the  meantime." 
We  have  built ocean  outfalls  and  treatment 
plants,  and  we have existing  policies  concerning 
the  level of treatment,  pretreatment,  disposal 
and  source  control.  This  note  discusses a 
framework  for  such  policies. 
The  natural  place to begin a policy  analysis 
is  with  questions of resource  commitment.  These 
are  the  practical  questions  which  legislatures 
and  agencies  deal  with.  But  besides  the  fact 
that  questions of resource  commitment  are  the 
bottom  line  questions  for  government  bodies, 
there is an other  reason  for  starting  here. 
Starting  with  questions  of  resource 
commitment  helps  structure  scientific  information 
and  research  for  decision  purposes. By itself, 
scientific  inquiry  is an open-ended  process,  with 
investigation of  each  interesting  question 
leading  to  several  more  interesting  questions. 
To structure  information  for  decision  purposes, 
it  is useful  to  start  with a list of policy 
questions  which  have  to be  decided  at  the  current 
time,  one  way  or  another, by default if  not be 
active  choice.  Such  questions  might  include  the 
following  (list A )  : 
Al. How  much  regional  variation  should 
there  be  in  the  treatment  of  wastewater  and 
sludge? 
AZ. How advanced  should  be  the  treatment? 
A3. What  should  be  the  balance  between 
ocean  disposal  and  disposal  into  other  media? 
A4.  What  should  be  the  balance  between 
treatment  at  the  sewage  plant  and  pre-treatment 
by industrial  firms  before  disposal  into  the 
municipal  sewage  system? 
A5. How  much  source  control  should  there 
be? 
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A6. What  research  and  monitoring  should  be 
sponsored by government  agencies? 
While  these  and  similar  questions  help 
organize  analysis,  it  is  not  possible  to  answer 
them directly.  They  depend in large  measure on 
judgments as to  the  seriousness or the  effects  of 
wastewater  and  sludge  disposal.  The  main 
questions  of  effects  can  be  briefly  summarized  in 
list  B: 
B1. How bad  is  the  toxics  problem?  How 
severe  is  the  problem  of  metals? 
B2. How bad  is  the  problem  with  pathogens 
and  communicable  diseases? 
B3. How  much  damage  is  there  to 
recreational  use  of  coastal  water? 
B4.  How  severe  is  the  stress  to  marine 
polulations? 
These  questions  in  turn  depend  on 
interpreting  the  existing  scientific  information. 
The  decision  maker  (or  policy  analyst)  and 
the  scientist  tend  to  work  in  opposite 
directions. To organize  and  focus  his  inquiry, 
the  decision  maker  begins  with  the  practical, 
bottom  line  questions  of  decision  (list  A)  and 
works  back to the  questions  of  effects  (list B)
and  what  is  known  about  marine  transport  and 
chemical  and  biological  systems.  The  scientist 
tends  to  work  forward,  beginning  with  the 
physical  inputs  to  coastal  waters,  to  model  the 
causal  flows  as  they  move  forward in time. A s  
another  difference, to  put  it crudely,  scientists 
are more  interested  in  truth  while  policy  makers 
are  more  interested  in  cost. It may  not  matter 
very  much  to  a  policy  maker  whether  a  particular 
species is flourishing, he  is  more  interested  in 
what  the  flourishing,  or  non-flourishing,  means 
for  treatment requiments. For  a  scientist  it 
may  matter  intrinsically. 
When  scientists  and  policy  makers  do  not 
recognize  these  differences  in  direction  and 
style, they  talk  past  each  other. In my view, 
for  nanaging  marine  problems,  neither  approach by 
itself  is  the  right  one.  Both  are  needed,  and 
both  need  to  be  done  at  the  same  time.  The  trick 
is to  structure  the  two  approaches o that  each 
contributes  to  the  other. 
The  way  they  fit  together  is  sketched in 
Figure 1. The  science-first  approach  begins  in 
the  upper  left  corner  and  works  down  toward  the 
lower  right  corner.  Actual  systems  (the  top  row) 
cannot  be  understood  directly,  but  scientists  try 
to  make  their  models  correspond  to  the  actual 
systems  as  closely  as  possible -- knowledge  for 
its own sake. Much  attention  is  devoted  to 
tightening  the  correspondence (a)  and  developing 
detailed  submodels. 
The  policy-first  approach  begins  in  the 
lower  right  corner  of  Figure 1 and  works  back 
toward  the  phenomena  of  the  upper  left.  Policy 
analysis,  especially  in  the form of  cost-benefit 
analysis  focused of the  evaluation  of  effects  and 
costs  of  control (b). 
Given  the  complexity  of  marine  systems  and 
the  enormous  uncertainty  involved,  it  is  fair  to 
ask  what  might be  gained from  a  policy  approach 
that attempts to work  back  from  potential 
decisions  in  the  lower  right  corner  of  Figure 1 
toward  the  phenomena  of  the  upper  left.  There 
are  three  types  of  benefits. 
First,  in  a few cases  the  analysis  may  be 
clearcut,  with  eifects  and  control  possibilities 
well  enough  understood so that  the  expected  net 
benefits of various  decision  alternatives  can be 
estimated  quantitatively, and  a  single  course  of 
action  selected  as  offering  the  highest  net 
benefits. 
Second,  in  many  cases  the  uncertainties  are 
sufficiently  pervasive so that  explicit 
calculation  of  expected  net  benefits  from 
alternative  possible  decisions  is  not  very 
helpful.  Nonetheless,  "islands  of  relative 
certainty"  rise  above  the  sea  of  uncertainty. 
These  islands  are  not  built  upon  underwater 
mountains  of  evidence,  like  normal  islands,  but 
on  broad  understanding  of  what  appear  to  be  the 
largest  and  most  important  effects,  in  their 
qualitative  evaluation of costs  and  benefits. In 
such  cases  the  existing  evidence  is  not 
conclusive in a  scientific  sense,  but  accumulates 
in  favor  of  the  relative  certainty,  and  suggests 
that  further  resolution  of  uncertainty  will 
strengthen  the  evidence.  For  example,  concern 
with  toxic  chemical  discharge  into  ocean  water 
existed  a  decade  ago  (Brooks [19711). Research 
in  the  intervening  period  has  strengehened  our 
concern,  and  it  appears  likely  that  future 
research  wlll  further  strengthen  it. 
Third, and  perhaps  most  important,  the 
approach  which  starts  with  policy  first,  even 
when  not  yielding  specific  decicions,  may  offer 
some  guidance  as  to  the  process  of  policy 
formation. 
To  an  audience of  scientists  the  importance 
of the  science-first  approach  needs no lengthy 
discussion. I will  merely  note  that  the  bottom 
line  questions  that  the  policy  maker  starts  with 
typically  come  from  scientists'  informal 
identifications of the  important  questions.  And 
of  course  the  information  needed  to  address  list 
B  comes  from  Scientists,  most  of  whom  are 
following  a  science-first  approach. 
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We  need  a  flexible  framework  which is  broad 
enough  to  encompass  both  approaches  and  tie  them 
together. In my  view,  statistical  decision 
theory  provides  at  least  part  of  that  framework. 
A  narrow  version of: cost-benefit  analysis  accepts 
the  predicted  effects  (it  tends  to  use  point 
estimates)  and  concentrates on the  problem  of 
evaluation.  Applied a little more  broadly, 
statistical  decision  theory  focuses  more n the 
interpretation  of  uncertainty in the  scientists' 
judgments,  Applied  still  more  broadly, 
statistical  decision  theory  attempts  to  minimize 
the  expected  costs  over  the  decision  process 
taken  as  a  whole. 
At  each  period  of  the  decision  process  there 
are  two  types  of  decisions  that  need  to  be  made. 
The  first is a  decision, on the basis  of  the 
current  state ot information,  concerning  the 
appropriate  interim  level  of  action.  To  address 
the  first  question  is  to  ask  "what  do we do in 
the  meantime,  before  all  the  important 
uncertainties  are  resolved?"  Since  the  current 
state or information  is  often  fragmentary,  the 
appropriate  acton  may  be  a  hedging  strategy,  or 
an  interim  precautionary  action. It is  important 
to  realize  that  the  meantime can be  a  long  time, 
for  problems  of  marine  management  where  many 
important  uncertainties  are  unlikely  to  be 
resolved in the near future. The second is a 
decision,  also on the  basis  of  the  current  state 
of information, as to  what  information  to  gather 
for the  next  period  of  the  decision  process. 
This  is  the  question f research  priority. 
At  the  next  period  the  two  same  two 
questions  are  addressed  again,  but  from  the 
perspective  of a  new  state of information  and  a 
new situation. The  state of  information  is 
different  because  of  the  research  undertaken in 
the  last  period,  and  the  situation  is  different 
because  of  the  interim  action  taken  in  the  last 
period  (and  of  course  there  additional  sources  of 
information  and  changes  that  were  not 
specifically  planned). 
In going  from  this  general  framework  to  the 
identification o t  the  best  interim  action,  for 
this  period,  we  need  several  ingredients.  We 
need  a  specification  of  the  main  hypotheses 
related  to  the  decision  alternatives, an 
assessment of the  likelihoods  of the  hypotheses, 
an  assessment  of  the  costs  and  benefits 
associated with the  decision  alternatives,  an 
assessment of the  costs  of  the  possible  wrong 
decisions  which  are  not  completely  avoidable 
because of the  uncertainty,  and an  assessment of 
the  likelihoods  of  wrong  decisions  as  functions 
of  the  various  possible  decisions. 
In going  from  the  general  framework  to  the 
identification of the  most  important research to 
undertake,  the  same  ingredients  are  needed,  plus 
one  more. We also  need  to assess  the  possible 
impacts  of  alternative  information  gathering 
activities on the  probabilities  of  wrong 
decisions.  Such  assessment  goes  under  the  name 
"value  of  information"  (see DeGroot [19711). 
It is  sometimes  suggested  that  the  work  of 
policy  analysts  and  decision  makers  be  kept 
separate  from  the  work  of  the  scientists,  lest 
the  questions of evaluation  taint  the  science. A 
division of  labor  is a good  idea,  but  only 
insofar  as  the  divided  labors  fit  together  in  a 
common  framework. 
The  framework  offered  here  is  that  of 
minlmizing  the  expected  cost  of  the  decision 
process  taken as a whole.  While  it  is  possible 
to  adopt  this  framework  and keep the  roles  of 
decision  makers  and  scientists  separate,  to  make 
the  framework  successful  communication  between 
the  scientists  and  decision  makers  must  be 
considerably  improved. 
The  framework  is  admittedly  not  a  complete 
one -- it  does  not  deal  with  questions  of  equity 
and  rights.  These  latter  questions  can  and 
should  be  addressed.  But  even  in  its  limited 
form of expected  cost  minimization,  the  framework 
is  probably an improvement  over  what we  are  doing 
now.  By  addressing  questions  of  equity  and 
rights we may be able  to  improve  the  proess of 
management  still  further. 
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